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Abstract
In this paper, we rely on an exogenous shock to examine the impact of litigation risk on real
earnings management (REM). We conduct differences-in-differences tests centered on an
unanticipated court ruling that reduced litigation risk for firms headquartered in the Ninth
Circuit. REM increases significantly following the ruling for Ninth-Circuit firms relative to
other firms, consistent with litigation risk deterring REM. Additional analyses reveal that REM
rises more following the ruling when firms issue more optimistic disclosures. The evidence is
consistent with litigation deterring REM by constraining managers’ ability to issue optimistic
and misleading disclosures that can conceal the myopic and opportunistic motives underlying
REM. We further document that an increase in REM in response to a decline in litigation risk
is more pronounced when managers have higher incentives to manipulate earnings and
governance mechanisms are weaker.

Keywords: Real Earnings Management, Earnings Management, Deterrence, Litigation,
Corporate Governance
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INTRODUCTION
Real earnings management (REM) refers to managers’ attempts to overstate earnings
by altering underlying real transactions in a way that is often detrimental for long-term value
(Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 2005; Roychowdhury 2006). In anonymous surveys,
executives admit to a preference for this method of managing earnings relative to manipulating
accruals (Bruns and Merchant 1990; Graham, et al. 2005). This is cause for concern, because
existing evidence indicates that REM is more opaque to external stakeholders and more
negatively associated with future firm performance and stock returns than accruals
management (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Kothari, Mizik and Roychowdhury 2016). Not
surprisingly, the literature has been interested in factors that constrain REM, with most of the
focus centering on external and internal corporate governance (Bushee 1998; Zang 2012; Chen,
Cheng, Lo, and Wang 2015; Cheng, Lee and Shevlin 2016). In the case of voluntary disclosures
and financial reporting, litigation risk has been shown to be a powerful disciplining force in
addition to governance (Skinner 1994; Hopkins 2017). In this context, the goal of our paper is
to examine whether the threat of litigation deters managers from engaging in REM.
REM involves the overstatement of earnings via real actions that depart from normal
operational and investment processes. Examples include overproduction, aggressive
acceleration of sales and reduction of discretionary expenses (Graham, et al. 2005;
Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 2012). The influence of litigation risk on REM is more ambiguous
than that on disclosure and financial reporting practices, as discussed below.
REM is not directly susceptible to class action lawsuits, which typically allege that
managers issued misleading disclosures or financial reports. The “business judgment” principle
allows for the possibility that managers exercised their best judgment in choosing their actions,
even though there were negative consequences ex post, providing legal cover for REM. It is
important to consider, however, that REM hardly exists in a vacuum. A significant number of
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class action lawsuits accuse managers of issuing misleading disclosures whose origins are
rooted in REM. This is because managers bear the risk that they have to explain to the investing
community and financial analysts the rationale for short-term actions undertaken to boost
earnings but detrimental to long-term value. REM can thus require managers to misrepresent
business circumstances or the true intent of their actions (Lo, Ramos and Rogo 2017). Such
statements, when revealed later to be misleading and deceptive, can become subject to lawsuits.
For example, over 2009-2010, analysts and auditors suspected Green Mountain Coffee of
overproducing inventory over successive periods to under-report their cost of goods sold
(Green Mountain Coffee Class Action, 2012). Green Mountain Coffee managers repeatedly
represented the sustained inventory increases as a response to “booming” business and surging
demand. When Green Mountain eventually started missing sales and earnings targets,
shareholders sued the company alleging that managers had misrepresented business conditions
and misled shareholders about their inventory policies. 1 Because of this link between REM and
misleading disclosures, higher threat of litigation can deter managers from engaging in REM.
Litigation may also encourage REM. Managers intending to overstate earnings tend to
shift from manipulating accruals to real actions when accounting practices are under intense
regulatory or court scrutiny (Cohen and Zarowin 2010, Zang, 2012). Consistent with this
notion, Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008) document that firms switched from accruals management
to REM after the Sarbanes and Oxley Act (SOX), which strengthened regulatory oversight over
financial reporting. Since higher litigation risk is known to constrain accruals manipulation
(Hopkins 2017), it may induce managers to engage in more REM. Overall, the net effect of
litigation risk on REM is not obvious ex ante.

1

The following section (subsection “Class Action Lawsuits Involving REM”) discusses in greater detail litigation
cases in which misleading disclosures issued to justify opportunistic overproduction of inventory, cost-cutting and
channel-stuffing led to litigation.
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To circumvent endogeneity in the relation between litigation risk and earnings
management, we study changes in REM following an exogenous shock to the stringency of
securities class action litigation standards in the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court District. On July 2,
1999, the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a surprising ruling (re: Silicon Graphics
Inc. Securities Litigation) requiring plaintiffs to prove that defendants acted with “deliberate
recklessness”. The requirement significantly increased the hurdle for successful litigation
against corporations headquartered in this circuit and reduced their litigation risk (Pritchard
and Sale 2005). Since the shock affected only firms located in states belonging to the Ninth
Circuit, we are able to compare their post-ruling changes in REM to those of firms located in
states belonging to other circuits in differences-in-differences tests.
Using a sample of firm-years spanning four years before and four years after the 1999
ruling which reduced litigation risk for Ninth Circuit firms, we find significant post-ruling
increases in REM for these firms relative to firms located in other circuits. Our tests include
firm and year fixed effects. The results are incremental to any increase in accruals management
following the ruling, and are robust to a battery of tests controlling for systematic differences
between Ninth Circuit firms and other firms. In parallel trends analyses, we find no trending
differences preceding the ruling. Further, we document that REM also increases following
exogenous shocks that reduce investors’ ability to launch derivative lawsuits. The collective
evidence is strongly indicative of litigation risk acting as a deterrent to REM.
To substantiate the argument that the deterrence effect of litigation on REM arises due
to its link with misleading optimistic disclosure, we next focus on three different manifestations
of optimism: (a) optimistic tone in the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) section
of 10K-s, (b) optimistic tone in the earnings press releases, and (c) optimistic management
forecasts. We find that the post-ruling increase in REM is more pronounced in Ninth Circuit
firms with abnormally positive tone in the MD&As and in the earnings press releases. In
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addition, REM increases more for Ninth Circuit firms that issue optimistic forecasts. Overall,
these results provide evidence on the link between litigation risk, REM and misleading
disclosures.
Our next set of tests provide evidence that litigation risk is a more salient deterrent to
REM in those firms in which managers have heightened incentives to manipulate earnings and
face weaker governance constraints on their ability to do so. Consistent with the role of
incentives, REM increased more following the ruling for Ninth Circuit firms meeting/beating
analysts’ forecasts and for those in which managers engaged in greater opportunistic insider
sales of stock. Consistent with the positive role of governance, post-ruling REM increases were
less pronounced for Ninth Circuit firms with lower managerial entrenchment, higher
institutional ownership, and higher ownership by institutions more likely to monitor the firm.
One possibility is that managers are truly optimistic at the time of their operational and
investment decisions, and these decisions manifest as REM in our empirical measurement. Our
cross-sectional findings are important in this context. They highlight that at the very least,
litigation risk deters managerial actions that are not just motivated by optimism, but are also
more likely to be perceived as opportunistic.
In the light of previous evidence suggesting that managers make more aggressive
accrual choices following the Ninth Circuit ruling (Hopkins 2017), we examine how postruling increases in earnings management via real activities vary with that via accruals. We find
that REM increases more for Ninth Circuit firms that report lower discretionary accruals. Our
results imply that increases in REM and accruals manipulation following the ruling were
negatively correlated in the cross-section of Ninth Circuit firms. Thus, the increase in REM
cannot be attributed simply to the same firms increasing all types of earnings management.
Research on factors that constrain REM has focused on various aspects of the firm’s
governance: the appropriate design of the executive compensation package (Chen et al. 2015),
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the checks and balances within a firm, that is, internal corporate governance (Cheng et al.
2016), and the monitoring role of long-term institutional investors (Bushee 1998;
Roychowdhury 2006). Our results suggest that litigation is an important force because it
provides recourse to shareholders when governance, incentive mechanisms and other sources
of monitoring fail. The ex post settling-up opportunity that litigation provides also makes it an
effective ex ante deterrent to REM.
By considering both earnings management and disclosure choices, our paper provides
a significantly expanded view of how litigation risk affects managerial attempts to mislead
investors. Hopkins (2017) and Chen, Li and Xu (2018) provide evidence on litigation risk
deterring managers from engaging in aggressive accrual choices. Accrual manipulations are in
and of themselves misrepresentations and can lead to financial restatements and SEC
enforcement actions, which can directly become the subject of lawsuits (Dechow, Sloan and
Sweeney 1996). The ability of litigation risk to constrain REM is less obvious, since REM per
se does not necessarily constitute a misrepresentation. Our findings are important in this
context as they suggest that opportunistic real actions can attract scrutiny and require managers
to misrepresent the purpose or the circumstances of these actions, which in turn can lead to
litigation. Thus, higher litigation risk can discipline managers’ real actions by tightening the
constraints on managers’ ability to issue misleading disclosures.
Finally, Bourveau et al. (2017) document that a decline in the threat of derivative
lawsuits is associated with an increase in the frequency of both optimistic and pessimistic
management forecasts, implying an improvement in voluntary disclosure quality. Using the
same setting, Lin, Liu and Manso (2017) find that innovation increases when litigation risk
subsides. Thus, a decline in litigation risk can improve the quality of disclosures as well as
operational and investment decisions. Our results strike a cautionary note on these benefits by
pointing to the costs associated with a reduced threat of lawsuits. In the presence of short term
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goals and managerial opportunism, reduced litigation risk can increase myopic real actions
accompanied by misleading disclosures to conceal the true intent of those actions.

SETTING AND HYPOTHESES
Real Earnings Management (REM) Methods
The literature points to multiple ways in which managers can overstate earnings via
their real actions. These actions include overproduction, channel-stuffing, and aggressive
reduction of discretionary expenses (Bushee 1998; Graham et al. 2005; Roychowdhury 2006;
Stubben 2010; Zang 2012).
Overproduction refers to the practice of producing quantities significantly higher than
expected sales and normal levels of target inventory. Higher-than-normal production levels can
conceivably result from anticipated increases in demand. However, overproduction (higher
than normal production without corresponding anticipated increases in future demand) can also
be driven by a managerial focus on inflating short-term profitability at the expense of longterm value, in at least two ways. First, when the overproduced units are not sold and remain in
inventory, fixed costs are spread out over all produced units because of absorption costing and
cost of goods sold is understated, inflating current-period earnings. Larger inventories resulting
from overproduction impose holding costs on firms and can also lead to future losses because
of increased obsolescence risk. Second, managers can aggressively ship the overproduced
inventories to intermediate dealers even when retail demand is lacking, in order to book sales.
This practice, commonly referred to as “channel-stuffing” is often achieved by incentivizing
dealers to accept higher inventories with especially lenient sales terms such as price discounts.
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Concerns with channel-stuffing include a reduction in margins, supply chain inefficiencies and
inventory backlogs. 2
Overproduction and channel-stuffing can lead to unusual patterns either in the firm’s
own inventory or in the inventory held by downstream dealers that are likely to come under
scrutiny from investors and financial analysts. Consequently, managers have incentives to
characterize these actions as a response to increased demand even though the increases in
production and shipping of inventory may be disproportionately high relative to that in demand.
Another type of REM involves an aggressive (and opportunistic) reduction of
discretionary expenses such as maintenance, advertising or R&D expenditures. Managers can
portray these reductions as having a persistent positive influence on earnings, when in fact they
are unsustainable and/or detrimental to a company’s long-term competitiveness (Cohen and
Zarowin 2010; Kothari et al. 2016; Vorst 2016).

The Link between REM and Misleading Disclosure
As discussed above, REM involves decisions on pricing, production and discretionary
expenditures that involve firms’ operations and investments and can have implications for
value across multiple periods. Investors and analysts are therefore keenly interested in, and
often raise questions about these operational and investment choices, for example, in
conference calls (Tasker 1998).
In engaging in REM, managers bear the risk that they are asked to justify actions that
boost short-term earnings but are detrimental for long-term value. To successfully mislead,
managers would then be forced to misrepresent their true intentions and/or issue misleadingly
optimistic statements that justify their real actions. For example, managers may be tempted to

2

Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen et al. (2008) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) refer to the acceleration of sales via
price discounts and lenient credit terms that typically characterize channel stuffing as a manipulation of earnings
through real actions. Stubben (2010) points to managers overstating revenues using multiple possible methods
that can include real actions such as channel stuffing.
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justify excessive shipments to dealers as motivated by surging demand, or to characterize an
aggressive reduction of discretionary expenses as an elimination of inefficiencies. If these
claims and declarations are later suspected or revealed to be false, or motivated by a desire to
mislead, they can attract lawsuits. Lawsuits that allege misrepresentation may additionally rely
on evidence of REM to argue scienter and intent on the part of managers. The lawsuit cases
discussed next describe circumstances in which firms engaging in REM attracted lawsuits
because of associated misleading and optimistic statements that managers made to justify their
actions.

Class Action Lawsuits Involving REM
Class-action lawsuits that explicitly refer to managers’ real actions share some common
features. They typically allege intent to mislead, managerial actions that were detrimental for
firm and shareholder value, and associated misrepresentations and misleading disclosures. We
discuss a few examples below.
Over 2009-2010, analysts and auditors suspected Green Mountain Coffee of
overproducing inventory to under-report their cost of goods sold, due to a sustained increase in
inventory levels over successive periods (Green Mountain Coffee Class Action, 2012). Green
Mountain Coffee managers repeatedly represented the inventory increases as a response to
“booming” business and surging demand it was “straining to meet”. Eventually, in an effort to
convince investors that their production was indeed driven by high expected demand, company
officials allegedly started destroying and hiding excess inventory that had expired.
Shareholders ultimately formed a class-action in September 2010 accusing managers of
misrepresenting demand and actively concealing their overproduced inventory. Plaintiffs relied
heavily on evidence of rising inventory levels resulting from overproduction to support the
claim that managers had intended to mislead. The case was further strengthened by the
evidence that managers benefited personally by selling their shares while misleading investors
8

and attributing the increases in production to surging demand. The case was initially dismissed
but the dismissal was later reversed by the Appeals Court. The case was relaunched in 2015,
with Green Mountain finally settling in 2018 for $36.5 million (Green Mountain Coffee Class
Action 2012, 2015, Settlement Agreement 2018).
In a well-publicized channel-stuffing case, Coca Cola Inc. paid $137.5 million to settle
a lawsuit accusing it of overstating demand while using price discounts to ship excessive
inventory of concentrate to their bottlers, where it stagnated because retail demand was lacking
(Coca Cola Settlement Agreement, 2008). Other high-profile security class actions involving
channel-stuffing include the lawsuit against Bristol-Myers Squibb Company in 2002 and that
against General Motors in 2012 (Bristol-Myers Squibb Class Action 2002; General Motors
Class Action 2012).
The securities class action lawsuit against Hospira Inc. in 2011 was focused on an
aggressive reduction of discretionary expenses. Hospira had initiated a significant cost-cutting
initiative in March 2009 that they called "Project Fuel". Managers claimed the cost cuts would
“increase shareholder value by eliminating underperforming and duplicative units and
reducing its global workforce." Shareholders alleged that managers misrepresented their true
intentions, because the initiative reduced remediation costs and resulted in higher margins in
the short term while compromising crucial quality control procedures (Hospira Class Action
2011; Reuters 2014). Specifically the lawsuit accused the management of “…gutting quality
control efforts through cost cutting aimed at boosting short-term profitability." The lawsuit
alleged that by the time the FDA detected the quality control deficiencies, product quality had
suffered, sales had declined, and the delayed remediation had become significantly more costly.
Hospira settled the case in 2014 for $60 million.
Excessive cost-cutting to boost short-term profitability at the expense of long-term
competitiveness was also a key component of the class action lawsuit against AT&T in 2001.
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Shareholders claimed that upon becoming CEO at AT&T in 1997, C. Michael Armstrong was
keen to demonstrate improved profitability and pursued extensive cost-cutting measures that
eliminated “billions of dollars of overhead” and involved the termination of thousands of
employees including experienced service representatives and sales personnel. This aggressive
expense-reduction initially yielded a sharp increase in earnings and a surge in AT&T’s stock
price. However AT&T’s management did not reveal that their intense cost-cutting resulted in
a significantly depleted ability to grow revenues in their most important business: long-distance
calls by multinational companies. Furthermore, the elimination of service personnel negatively
impacted AT&T’s ability to retain customers, leading to the departure of several high-profile
clients such as BP Amoco, Pepsi and Chase Manhattan. When profitability and revenues
ultimately declined immediately following AT&T’s public issue of tracking stock,
shareholders sued the company. They alleged that managers at AT&T were aware that the
positive effects of their cost cuts were short-lived and deliberately concealed imminent revenue
declines. Further, the lawsuit alleged that AT&T managers intentionally misattributed their
poor profitability to “higher-than-anticipated wireless and cable upgrade costs”, when in fact,
they were aware it was driven by revenue declines resulting from their earlier aggressive costcutting programs. The lawsuit lasted four years and was eventually settled for $100 million.

Class Action Lawsuits and the Ninth Circuit Court Ruling
The 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) requires plaintiffs in
securities class action lawsuits to provide proof of scienter (i.e., intent or knowledge of wrongdoing). But the exact interpretation of the act’s pleading standards is left to the individual U.S.
circuit courts. The Ninth Circuit Court was considered one of the most plaintiff-friendly circuit
courts with a high volume of securities class action litigation (Gibney 2001; Pritchard and Sale
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2005). 3 It thus came as a surprise that on July 2, 1999 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued
a ruling (Re: Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, 183 F.3d 970) that resulted in a much
stricter interpretation of pleading standards than in any other circuit courts (Johnson, Nelson
and Pritchard 1999; Grundfest and Pritchard 2002). 4 According to the ruling, to form a class,
the plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit are required to show that the defendants acted with “deliberate
recklessness”, rather than mere “recklessness” which is sufficient in other circuits. 5 The Ninth
Circuit ruling introduced a particularly high burden of proof given that evidence of intent is
usually obtained only in discovery, after a class has been formed. Empirical evidence indicates
that the ruling significantly reduced the incidence of class action lawsuits. Crane and Koch
(2018) document that relative to the first half of 1999, lawsuit filings in the second half
decreased in the Ninth Circuit by 43% compared to an increase of 14% in other circuits.6
Pritchard and Sale (2005) point out that the exceptionally strict pleading standards in the Ninth
Circuit led to a higher rate of case dismissals.
Studying the effect of litigation risk on earnings management is challenging because of
endogeneity. If firms more likely to engage in earnings management are more susceptible to
litigation, this would manifest as a positive association between the two, which however would
not necessarily imply that litigation risk encourages earnings management (Skinner 1997;
Hopkins 2017). The Ninth Circuit ruling allows us to circumvent this endogeneity. It facilitates

3

The Ninth Circuit includes the following states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
Oregon, and Washington.
4
The ruling was very likely driven by the ideologies of the ruling judges. The Ninth Circuit randomly selects
three judges to adjudicate such cases (Hopkins 2017). In the case of Silicon Graphics, two conservative judges
were selected, and they voted against the plaintiffs. The liberal-leaning third judge dissented, voting in favor of
the plaintiffs.
5
Re: Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999) involved an allegation that managers
engaged in insider trading after issuing misleading statements to hype the stock price. The case was dismissed on
the premise that stock sales coupled with negative internal performance news are insufficient to prove that
managers’ actions were deliberate.
6
Crane and Koch (2018) find a similar magnitude of post-ruling changes in lawsuits filings between the Ninth
Circuit and other circuits over longer horizons as well (from the beginning of 1998 to the end of 2000, and over
their sample period: 1996-2014). Houston, Lin, Liu and Wei (2015) also confirm decline in the number of class
action lawsuits filed in the Ninth Circuit relative to other jurisdictions following the ruling.
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a differences-in-differences framework in which we compare post-ruling changes in REM in
firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit to similar changes in firms headquartered in other
circuits. We use the firm’s headquarters to determine the most likely location of litigation
because most lawsuits are ultimately litigated where the firm is headquartered. 7

Hypotheses
Recent evidence points to the power of the Ninth Circuit setting to detect changes in
managers’ disclosure and reporting behavior in response to reduced litigation risk. Houston et
al. (2015) and Cazier, Christensen, Merkley and Treu (2017) use the Ninth Circuit ruling to
provide evidence on the disciplining effect of litigation on management forecasts and nonGAAP reporting. 8 Hopkins (2017) finds that Ninth Circuit firms exhibit increased restatement
frequency and higher revenue management following the ruling, consistent with litigation risk
deterring managers from misstating financial statements. Hopkins (2017) attributes his
evidence to misleading reporting choices. One caveat to his interpretation is that the empirical
proxy for revenue management cannot distinguish between higher revenues being achieved via
accruals or via real actions (see Stubben 2010).
The influence of changes in litigation risk on REM is ambiguous. Given the intrinsic
information asymmetry about real operations between a firm’s managers and its external
stakeholders, REM is more opaque and thus harder to detect than financial reporting violations
and accrual manipulations (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Kothari et al. 2016). Further, REM
involves business decisions which managers could justify as sound given their interpretation
of the economic circumstances, invoking the so called “business judgment” principle. Proving

7

Hopkins (2017) finds that at least 84% of lawsuits are ultimately litigated in the district of the firm’s headquarters.
Filing lawsuits in districts other than the firm’s headquarters is costly and time-consuming for the plaintiffs.
Moreover, even if shareholders were to file lawsuits against the firm in various locations, legal panels consolidate
these lawsuits and relocate them to the district with the easiest access to documents and witnesses, i.e., a firm’s
headquarters (Cox, Thomas and Bai 2009; Hopkins 2017; Houston et al. 2015).
8
Houston et al. (2015) find that management forecasts become less frequent and less accurate and Cazier et al.
(2017) find that non-GAAP reporting increases following the Ninth Circuit ruling.
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intentional wrong-doing under securities law may thus be significantly more difficult in the
case of REM, negatively impacting shareholders’ ability to form a class. Thus, it is possible
that opportunistic and myopic real actions are “immune” to changes in litigation risk.
However, as already discussed above, REM is likely to be accompanied by misleading
disclosures and misrepresentations, as managers attempt to conceal the myopic and
opportunistic nature of REM. An increase in the threat of litigation raises the expected costs to
managers of issuing such misleading disclosures and misrepresentations. Reduced managerial
ability to issue optimistic and misleading disclosures, in turn, is likely to deter REM, since it
erodes managers’ ability to disguise the true intent underlying their actions.
The expected costs of litigation associated with REM can be significant and include not
only monetary expenditures but also loss of reputation and capital market penalties, even in
instances when the lawsuits are ultimately dismissed. For example, settlement costs alone for
Bristol-Myers-Squibb, Coca Cola and Hospira Inc. amounted to $300 million, $137.5 million,
and $60 million respectively. 9 The case against General Motors alleging overproduction and
channel-stuffing of inventory was ultimately dismissed but dragged on for three years,
absorbing managers’ attention, their time and expensive legal resources. GM’s stock price
declined over 30% as the market learned about the inventory issues (General Motors Class
Action, 2012). Thus, the uncertainty about the eventual outcome of lawsuits, the opportunity
cost of managers’ time, and the loss of market value can make litigation extremely costly. This
has the potential to deter REM. If that is the case, following the decline in expected litigation
costs with the 1999 ruling, REM would increase in firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit
relative to other firms.

9
See Bristol Myers Squibb Settlement Agreement (2004), Coca Cola Settlement Agreement (2008), and Hospira
Settlement Agreement (2014).
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It is also conceivable that a more litigious environment that discourages opportunistic
reporting choices can encourage REM. Cohen et al. (2008) document firms replaced accruals
management with more real earnings management after the Sarbanes and Oxley Act in 2002
(SOX), which strengthened regulatory oversight over financial reporting. Cohen and Zarowin
(2010) find evidence consistent with REM being higher when there is greater auditor scrutiny
of accruals and lower ability to manipulate accruals. Similarly, Badertscher (2011) provides
evidence that managers engage in REM to sustain overvaluation only when they have
exhausted their ability to manage accruals. Thus, it is possible that higher litigation risk
encourages managers to manipulate earnings via real activities instead of accruals. In that case,
the reduction in litigation risk with the 1999 ruling would lead to declines in REM at the Ninth
Circuit firms, as they begin relying more on accruals management.
In summary, the net effect of litigation risk on real earnings management is an empirical
question. Our subsequent analyses are thus designed to test the following two-sided hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (null): Real earnings management (REM) in firms headquartered in the Ninth
Circuit relative to firms headquartered in other circuits did not change after the 1999 ruling.

SAMPLE DESCRIPTION, RESEARCH DESIGN AND VARIABLES

Sample
We begin the sample selection process by obtaining data on all publicly listed firms
from the Compustat/CRSP database with non-missing information on historical headquarters
over the period 1995-2003. 10 Our tests compare the post-ruling period, four years beginning
the year after the ruling (2000-2003), to the pre-ruling period, four years preceding the Ninth

10

To determine the relevant court circuit, we use the firm’s historical headquarters at the time of the ruling
obtained from 10-K filings from Edgar online. The historical headquarters are not available from COMPUSTAT,
which backfills the data and instead reports the current headquarters for all firm-years in the database.
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Circuit court ruling (1995-1998). The year of the ruling, 1999, is excluded from the analysis.
We restrict our analyses to four years before and four years after the ruling to limit concerns
about the potential effect of confounding events over longer horizons. 11
The sample excludes firms in financial industries (sic 6000-6999) and utilities (sic
4000-4999), as well as penny stocks (firms with stock price smaller than $1). We next require
the availability of COMPUSTAT and CRSP data necessary to construct our control variables. 12
We include only firms with at least one year of data in both the pre- and post-1999 periods. We
winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentile.

Research Design and Variable Definitions
We classify a firm as treated (or a “Ninth Circuit” firm) if its headquarters are located
in one of the states subject to the Ninth Circuit Court. 13 The remaining firms are classified as
“controls”. Our multivariate tests employ a differences-in-differences research design in which
we compare the changes in REM following the 1999 ruling for treated firms to the
corresponding changes for control firms.
We estimate the following differences-in-differences regression specification:
REMit = β0 + βi Postt × Ninth Circuiti + γ'Xit + FirmFE + YearFE + εit

(1)

i indexes firms and t time. The Post indicator takes the value of one from 2000 to 2003,
and zero from 1995 to 1998, while the Ninth Circuit indicator takes the value of one in all
sample years if the firm’s headquarters are located in one of the Ninth Circuit states. We expect
a significant and positive β, the coefficient on the interaction term Postt × Ninth Circuit.

11

Using a shorter alternative window of three years before and after 1999, that is 1996-2002, does not materially
influence our results. This shorter window would exclude any effect following the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley
Act in 2002.
12
Control variables we require include ROA, total assets, firm age, dividends, capital expenditures, leverage, cash,
debt issues, equity issues, abnormal accruals and institutional ownership (which is assumed zero when data is
unavailable on Thomson 13f). These variables are described in greater detail in the next section.
13
Firms change their headquarters infrequently. During our sample period, 147 firms (4.3% of the sample)
changed headquarter location, with 46 firms switching from non-Ninth Circuit states to Ninth Circuit states. The
largest shift occurred within non-Ninth Circuit firms, with 96 firms changing states, but not moving out of or into
the Ninth Circuit. Our results are robust to excluding firms that changed states of headquarters.

15

Because we include firm (FirmFE) and year (YearFE) fixed effects, we do not include Ninth
Circuit and Post indicators separately. These indicators are absorbed in the firm fixed effects
and year fixed effects respectively. We cluster standard errors by the state of headquarters.
Our tests use three measures of REM: (1) abnormal discretionary expenses (AbnDisx),
(2) abnormal production costs (AbnProd), and (3) an aggregate measure which combines
AbnDisx and AbnProd, denoted RM (see, for example, Cohen and Zarowin 2010 and Zang
2012). 14 Discretionary expenses are the sum of advertising expenses, R&D expenses and
SG&A expenses, while production costs refer to the sum of the cost of goods sold and the
change in inventory. The estimation of AbnDisx and AbnProd follows Kothari et al. (2016).
The two metrics are described in detail in in Appendix A, “Variable Definitions”.
Two specific features of our empirical proxies are worth noting. First, AbnDisx is
appropriately signed to yield a higher value when real earnings management is higher, that is,
when abnormal discretionary expenses are abnormally lower. Second, AbnProd is distinct from
the revenue management proxy used in Stubben (2010) and Hopkins (2017), which captures
overstatement of sales via both accruals and real actions. Unusually high AbnProd will capture
the effects of both overproduction and price discounts (as discussed in Roychowdhury 2006)
but will not be affected positively by any associated accrual manipulations, for example, underprovision for estimated returns on sales. 15 We add AbnDisx and AbnProd to construct the
aggregate measure, RM. In untabulated tests, we confirm that all three metrics of REM,
AbnDisx, AbnProd and RM are associated negatively with future operating performance,
measured as one-year-ahead ROA.
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We do not use abnormal cash flow from operations (CFO) because different methods of real earnings
management can have opposite effects on CFO (Roychowdhury, 2006).
15
If a firm under-provides for sales returns, net sales will be overstated. Since we use net sales as an explanatory
variable in the model for production costs, under-provision for sales returns will tend to yield lower production
costs relative to sales, not higher. This possibly weakens the power of the proxy AbnProd but does not cause it to
be higher as a result of accruals manipulation.
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X in equation (1) represents a vector of control variables. We control for firm
characteristics such as size (Firm Size), performance (ROA), capital structure and various
investment and financing decisions (Leverage, Cash, Dividends, CAPEX, Debt Issue, Equity
Issue, Acquisition). Given prior evidence on the link between institutional ownership and REM,
we include the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors (IO) in our
models. We assume zero institutional ownership when the firm is not included in Thomson
Financial 13F files. To capture real earnings management independent of any accruals
management, we control for abnormal accruals (AbnAcc). Finally, we control for the number
of acquisitions and assume zero for this variable for firm-years with no acquisitions according
to SDC. Since the Ninth Circuit court ruling represents an exogenous geographic shock to
litigation risk, we include state level variables to control for variation in socio-economic factors
that can affect managers’ propensity to manipulate their real actions (Hilary and Hui 2009;
McGuire, Omer and Sharp 2012; Heider and Ljungqvist 2015). These variables include GDP
Growth, Unemployment, Income, Population, Gender, Ethnicity, Education, and Vote
Democrat. All variables are defined in Appendix A.

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND PRIMARY RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for real earnings management measures as well
as the control variables for our sample. In every test, we use the maximum number of
observations for each dependent variable after requiring that all cross-sectional partitioning
variables be available as well. For example, our main analysis of the ruling’s effect on abnormal
discretionary expenses of the Ninth Circuit firms relative to non-Ninth Circuit firms includes
3,387 distinct firms and 15,225 firm-year observations between 1995 and 2003. The number
of observations is slightly lower for AbnProd at 14,958 than it is for AbnDisx as a consequence
17

of data availability. The intersection of observations with sufficient data to compute both
measures and to construct our aggregate measure RM includes 14,215 firm-years.

The

exclusion of penny stocks and the data requirements for computing earnings management
proxies leads to slightly larger and more profitable firms in our sample relative to the
COMPUSTAT population. The median firm in our sample has an ROA of 13.3%, total assets
of $199.8 million and institutional ownership of 34.7%.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
Table 2 provides some preliminary insights into the differences-in-differences in REM
in a univariate setting. The table reports pre- and post-ruling levels of our three REM measures
as well as changes in those measures separately for firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit
(Panel A) and those headquartered in other circuits (Panel B). Panels A and B also reports pvalues from t-tests of changes in REM from the pre- to the post-ruling period. As Panel A
demonstrates, Ninth Circuit firms exhibit increases in all three metrics of REM (AbnDisx,
AbnProd and RM) following the ruling. These increases are statistically significant for the
individual REM metrics AbnDisx and AbnProd but not for the composite metric RM. Panel C
reports the results for our main differences-in-differences tests comparing changes in REM for
Ninth-Circuit firms relative to those for non-Ninth-Circuit firms. All three measures increase
significantly at the 1% level. The univariate tests thus yield preliminary evidence consistent
with a decline in litigation risk resulting in a significant increase in REM.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Results of Multivariate Tests on Changes in Real Earnings Management
This section examines in multivariate tests whether the Ninth Circuit court ruling led to
any significant changes in REM (Hypothesis 1). We estimate equation (1) using our three
measures of REM as dependent variables. Table 3 presents the results. The coefficients on the
interaction term Post*Ninth Circuit are positive and significant, with p-values less than or equal
18

to 0.05 for all three measures of REM. The coefficients point to statistically significant
increases in REM following the ruling for Ninth Circuit firms relative to other firms. Moreover,
these increases are economically significant. The increase in AbnDisx represents 10% of one
standard deviation in Abnisdx and that in AbnProd represents 8.9% of one standard deviation
of AbnProd. The increase in the aggregate measure represents 10.1% of its standard deviation.
The results indicate that a decline in litigation risk with the Ninth Circuit ruling led to
significant increases in REM at Ninth Circuit firms relative to other firms, consistent with
litigation’s deterrence effect on REM. 16
The results in Table 3 also provide some support for the possibility that REM and
accruals manipulation occur in conjunction. The coefficient on AbnAcc is positive and
significant at the 5% level for all three REM metrics, suggesting complementarity between
REM and accruals management. Examples of this complementarity include managers channelstuffing but not adequately providing for estimated returns, and overproducing inventory but
not increasing their inventory obsolescence reserves.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
We next perform a number of robustness tests, beginning with a parallel-trends
analysis. This analysis investigates the possibility that the post-ruling changes reflect trending
differences between Ninth Circuit firms and other firms from prior to the ruling, and do not
result from the ruling itself. Table 4 reports the results. In these tests, 1995 (that is, year t-4)
serves as the benchmark year. We find no trending differences between the Ninth Circuit and
other circuit firms before the ruling. The coefficients on D(t=-1)*Ninth Circuit, D(t=-2)*Ninth
Circuit, and D(t=-3)*Ninth Circuit indicators are not significantly different from zero in any
of the columns. The results of this analysis imply that there are no pre-existing differential
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Our results are not sensitive to removing observations with missing institutional ownership. Moreover, for a
restricted sample with data available, we confirm that our results are robust to controlling for CEO tenure, where
we include both its first and second power (to allow for potential non-linearity, see Ali and Zhang 2015).

19

trends in REM between the Ninth Circuit firms and other firms. The differences appear in the
year after the ruling. The coefficient on D(t=1)* Ninth Circuit is significant and positive for
all three REM metrics. The differences continue to be significantly different in years two and
three after the ruling for AbnDisx, in year four for AbnProd and in all three years for the
composite metric RM. Additionally, Figure 1 Panel A provides a graph for the composite metric
RM for both treatment firms and control firms. The data in the graph is consistent with the
results we observe with the parallel trend regressions.
While real earnings management increases up to four years following the ruling, the
increases are economically more pronounced and statistically more significant in the first two
post-event years. One reason for this may be a lack of power – breaking the post-event period
into separate years and analyzing separate components of REM potentially weakens the power
of our tests. Second, it is also possible that in later years following the ruling, alternative
mechanisms step in to compensate for the reduced discipline from litigation risk. For example,
Crane and Koch (2018) document that institutional ownership in Ninth Circuit firms rises
following the ruling, which they interpret as a capital market response to the decline in
governance-by-litigation.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Our next set of robustness analyses aim to alleviate concerns that systematic differences
between the Ninth Circuit firms and non-Ninth Circuit firms contribute to our findings. First,
we confirm that our results are robust to re-estimating our regressions after augmenting them
with industry-year fixed effects. Next, we consider the specific concern that Ninth Circuit firms
are disproportionately represented by firms in high technology industries, which experienced
the crash of the internet bubble in 2000 (i.e., in the post-ruling period). We conduct two separate
tests in which we exclude from our sample (1) all firms in high technology industries, and (2)
all firms in industries with negative cumulative abnormal returns over the years 2000-2003.
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Despite a significant decline in the number of observations, we continue to find significant and
positive coefficients on Post*Ninth Circuit in all columns. To control for geographic factors,
we perform an adjacent-county analysis, in which we only include firms with headquarters
located within 40 miles of the state borders, where one of the borders passes the Ninth Circuit.17
We find positive coefficients on Post*Ninth Circuit in all three columns with p-values less than
0.05 (results untabulated). We also perform falsification tests in which we replace NinthCircuit firms with those from other circuits, circuit by circuit. We do not find consistent
significant difference-in-difference increases in REM for any other circuit. The results of these
tests are utnabulated, but available upon request.
Finally, we construct a propensity score matched sample of treatment and control firms.
Specifically, we limit our sample to the Ninth-Circuit and non-Ninth-Circuit firm-years that
are propensity score matched in year 1998 (the year before the ruling) on several firm
characteristics. 18 Table 5, Panel A shows the mean values of firm characteristics for the NinthCircuit and non-Ninth-Circuit firms in this propensity score matched sample, as well as pvalues from t-tests of differences. The matching is successful, yielding no significant
differences in the overall propensity matching score. Among individual firm characteristics,
only Firm Size is different at the 10% level between the treatment and the propensity score
matched control sample.
Panel B presents the various REM proxies for both the treated and propensity-scorematched control firms separately for the pre-ruling period and the post-ruling period. No REM
metric is significantly different between treated and control firms in the pre-ruling period, but
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This test exploits the fact that economic conditions and other unobserved confounding factors (e.g., social,
political) centric to certain geographic locations are likely to be similar across state borders, while the effects of
the Ninth Circuit ruling stop at a state’s border.
18
The characteristics include: industry membership defined as 2-digit SIC code, ROA, size, dividends, capital
expenditures, leverage, cash holdings, net debt issuance, equity issues, number of acquisitions, institutional
ownership and abnormal accruals.
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all REM metrics are significantly different for treatment firms following the ruling. 19 Table 5,
Panel C, columns (1)-(3) report the results from re-estimating equation (1) on the propensity
score matched sample. Despite a substantially lower number of observations, we find
significant post-ruling increases in REM at the Ninth Circuit firms relative to those at similar
firms in other circuits.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]

Results on Changes in REM and Misleading Disclosure
We next turn our attention to examining potential complementarities between REM and
misleading disclosures. Our tests utilize two primary measures of optimistic/misleading
disclosures: (1) abnormally optimistic tone of the Management and Discussion Section
(MD&A) of the 10-Ks (OptTone_MDA), and (2) abnormally optimistic tone of earnings
announcement press releases (OptTone_EPR). Tone is measured as the difference between the
count of positive and negative words scaled by the total number of words following the
Loughran and McDonald (2011) methodology. Abnormal tone is measured following Huang,
Teoh and Zhang (2014) as a residual from a regression of tone on a variety of factors that
capture the firm’s characteristics, performance and volatility. 20 Thus, positive or negative
abnormal tone captures unusual optimism or pessimism respectively on the part of the
managers providing the disclosures. OptTone_MDA and OptTone_EPR are set equal to one if
abnormal tone in the MD&A or the earnings press release are respectively positive.
Rogers, Van Buskirk and Zechman (2011) find evidence that optimistic tone attracts
class action litigation. Huang et al. (2014) report that unusually positive tone in earnings press
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In untabulated robustness tests we also match on REM metrics measured in 1998. After the matching, we find
no statistically significant differences between control and treated firms on any dimensions, including pre-ruling
REM. Our results are fully robust to this alternative matching procedure.
20
In arriving at abnormal tone, managerial tone is orthogonalized specifically with respect to the following factors:
earnings, returns, size, book-to-market, volatility of returns and earnings, firm age, number of business and
geographic segments, the incidence of losses, change in earnings, analyst forecast of earnings and analyst forecast
error.
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releases is associated with lower future earnings and cash flows as well as negative future
returns , and conclude that managers use positive tone to mislead shareholders. Prior evidence
suggests that significant variation exists in the content and tone of MD&A (Brown and Tucker
2010; Mayew, Sethuraman and Venkatachalam 2015; Muslu Radhakrishnan, Subramanyam
and Lim 2015). Further, Rogers et al. (2011) report that in a randomly selected sample of 20
lawsuits, 55% referenced optimistic statements occurring within the 10-Ks. Requiring the
availability of MD&As and the data for computing abnormal tone reduces the sample size
significantly. Earnings press releases are also a natural disclosure medium through which
managers can channel their optimism.21 Unfortunately, the availability of earnings press
releases is even more limited during our sample period (1995-2003). SEC mandated the filing
of earnings releases via form 8-Ks starting only in 2003. As a result, the text of earnings
releases before 2003 are available only for some firms via PR Newswire or Business Wire
starting from 1997 (Huang et al. 2014). In the tests relying on unusual optimism in earnings
press releases, the number of years in the pre-event period is thus restricted to two.
We expand our main specification to include each disclosure optimism measure
(OptTone_MDA and OptTone_EPR), as well as its respective interaction terms with Post, Ninth
Circuit, and Post*Ninth Circuit. We are particularly interested in the sign of the interaction
term between each optimism measure and Post*Ninth Circuit. Table 6 presents results with
abnormally optimistic tone of the MD&As (Panel A) and that of earnings press releases (Panel
B). The coefficients on Post*Ninth Circuit*OptTone_MDA are significant and positive for
AbnProd and RM. The coefficients on Post*Ninth Circuit*OptTone_EPR are significant and
positive for all three measures (AbbnDisx, AbnProd and RM). These results indicate that
following the decline in litigation risk with the ruling, REM increases are more pronounced in

21
While conference calls would be another form of communication worth examining to capture less scripted
optimism in managerial responses to analysts’ questions, conference call data is only available starting from 2001.
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those Ninth Circuit firms whose managers use abnormally optimistic tone in their MD&As and
earnings press releases, potentially to justify their actions.
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
In further analyses, we test whether the post-ruling REM increases are more
pronounced for Ninth Circuit firms that also issued optimistic management forecasts. A firmyear is classified as having an optimistic forecast if the last forecast before the fiscal period end
exceeds the consensus analyst expectations at the time. Hilary, Hsu, Segal and Wang (2016)
characterize management forecasts that exceed analyst expectations as indicative of overoptimism. Table 6, Panel C presents the results based on the indicator variable Optimistic
Forecast. We find that the coefficient on Post*Ninth Circuit* Optimistic Forecast is positive
in all three columns and statistically significant for AbnDisx and RM. The results are consistent
with managers using more optimistic forecasts of future earnings to justify their opportunistic
REM in the current period. Alternatively, it is also possible that managers issue more optimistic
earnings forecasts following the decline in litigation risk (Bourveau et al. 2017), and then
engage in increased REM to meet/beat those forecasts, consistent with Kasznik (1999). 22
Table 6, Panel D uses a composite indicator measure of disclosure optimism (Optimistic
Disclosure) that is set equal to one if abnormal tone in the MD&A or the earnings press release
was positive, or the manager issued an optimistic forecast prior to the fiscal year-end. 23 Using
this composite optimism metric, we observe that all three REM measures exhibit a significantly
more pronounced post-ruling increase for those firms that also issue optimistic disclosures. The
results suggest that in the post-ruling period, when managers manipulate real activities to report
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In additional untabulated tests, we find that post-ruling increases in REM at the Ninth-Circuit firms relative to
non-Ninth-Circuit firms are significantly more pronounced for firms that issue an optimistic forecast for the first
time (i.e., initiate an optimistic forecast).
23
Since our measure is meant to capture any form of optimism be it in MD&As, earnings releases or earnings
forecasts, we rely on the maximum possible data points available in the dataset, that is, the union of the datasets
used in the tests with each individual proxy for optimism.
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higher current earnings, they are more likely to support and legitimize their actions with
optimistic projections and explanations for their actions and/or reported performance.
Results on the Role of Incentives to Engage in Real Earnings Management
If the post-ruling increases in REM are symptomatic of heightened managerial myopia
and opportunism, the REM increases should be more pronounced when managers have greater
short-term incentives to report stronger financial performance. Specifically, we examine the
role of incentives to meet/beat earnings targets as well as incentives arising from insider selling.
To study whether increases in REM enable managers to meet/beat earnings targets, we
augment our main model to include variables that capture firms narrowly meeting or beating
earnings expectations (Narrow Beat), beating these expectations comfortably (Large Beat) and
narrowly missing expectations (Narrow Miss). We calculate the market expectation based on
the consensus analyst forecast for firms with analyst following, and last year’s EPS for firms
that are not followed by analysts. Narrow Beat is an indicator variable representing cases in
which the actual earnings per share (EPS) met or beat market expectations by less than two
cents. Large Beat refers to firm-years in which the actual EPS exceeded the expectation by two
cents or more. Narrow Miss is defined as actual EPS falling below the expectation by less than
two cents. We then interact these variables with Post, Ninth Circuit, and Post*Ninth Circuit.
Our interest is in the coefficients on Post*Ninth Circuit* Narrow Beat, Post*Ninth Circuit*
Large Beat, and Post*Ninth Circuit* Narrow Miss. Firm-years in which actual earnings are
below the expectation by a large margin are captured by Post*Ninth Circuit.
Table 7, Panel A reports the results from these tests. We find significant positive
coefficients on Post*Ninth Circuit* Narrow Beat in all three columns, indicating that the
increased use of REM after the ruling helps firms to meet/beat earnings targets by narrow
margins. The coefficients on Post*Ninth Circuit* Large Beat also indicate significant postruling increases in REM for the firms that beat expectations by wider margins, even though the
25

coefficients are economically of smaller magnitude than for the Narrow Beat group. Since
REM has to occur before fiscal year end, managers cannot always calibrate accurately the
extent to which they need to alter real actions to just meet/beat outstanding expectations,
potentially resulting in beating expectations by a larger margin. Interestingly, the coefficients
on Post*Ninth Circuit*Narrow Miss are negative and significant in two of the three columns,
indicating that fewer firms engage in REM and miss expectations by a narrow margin. We note
that the coefficient on Post*Ninth Circuit is not significantly different from zero: thus there
was no post-ruling changes in REM for Ninth-Circuit firms missing analyst forecasts by a large
margin. Together, our results suggest that reduced litigation risk “emboldened’ managers: they
were willing to engage in more REM and err on the side of comfortably beating expectations
rather than risk missing these expectations narrowly. However, in the absence of short-term
incentives, firms did not increase their REM.
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
We next examine whether post-ruling increases in REM at Ninth Circuit firms vary
with insider selling. In order to distinguish between routine and opportunistic trades by
executives we employ the methodology from Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012). We then
use the opportunistic insider trades to compute Insider Net Sell which is defined as the
percentage of shares outstanding sold net of the percentage of shares purchased by executives
when their sales exceed purchases, and zero otherwise. 24 We expand our main model to include
the interactions of this variable with Post, Ninth Circuit, and Post*Ninth Circuit. Consistent
with our expectations, we find in Table 7, Panel B that the coefficient on Post*Ninth Circuit*
Insider Net Sell is positive and significant with p-values less than 0.05 in all three columns.
The result indicates that the increases in REM are particularly pronounced when managers have
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Executives include officers of the firm such as CEOs, CFOs, Senior VPs and VPs.
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incentives to report strong performance to execute their opportunistic sales at more beneficial
prices.
In untabulated additional analyses, we limit the sample to those firm-years in which
managers had incentives to mislead (i.e., they met or beat earnings targets or were net-sellers
of stock). Within this sample, we find that post-ruling increases in REM at Ninth-Circuit firms
are significantly more pronounced if managers also engaged in optimistic disclosures. These
results confirm a significant relation between REM and optimistic disclosures in those firms in
which managers are likely to have acted opportunistically. 25
It is possible in principle that REM represents in part managers’ business judgment at
the time that it was undertaken. Our evidence on meeting/beating earnings targets and insider
selling is salient in this context, as it suggests that litigation risk constrains REM especially
when it is likely to be viewed as opportunistic by shareholders and other external stakeholders.
Results on the Role of Governance Constraints on REM
In this section, we investigate cross-sectional variation in how litigation’s deterrence
effect on REM varies cross-sectionally with corporate governance. We expect litigation risk to
be a more valuable deterrent when governance is weaker and less effective in restraining
managers from engaging in REM.
We focus on two aspects of governance: managerial entrenchment and institutional
ownership. Greater managerial entrenchment implies weaker governance, as both the board of
directors and the market for corporate control find it difficult to discipline entrenched managers
(Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009). Thus, even if shareholders were to expect increased REM
at Ninth Circuit firms at the time of ruling, their ability to constrain REM is lower when
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Specifically, we repeat our tests reported in Table 6, Panel D on the subsample of firm-years in which managers
had incentives to act opportunistically (i.e. they met or beat earnings expectations or were net sellers of stock),
we continue to find a significant positive coefficient on Post*Ninth Circuit*Optimistic Disclosure for all three
measures of REM.
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managers are more entrenched. We thus expect more pronounced post-ruling increases in REM
at Ninth Circuit firms with higher managerial entrenchment.
Turning to our second measure of governance, institutional owners are sophisticated
investors who are likely to monitor managers’ real choices more closely, and discourage
actions detrimental for long-term value. They are also known to influence managerial actions
via either voice or the threat of exit and do not rely solely on litigation (Parrino, Sias and Starks
2003; Edmans 2009; Edmans and Manso 2011). Thus institutional investors are likely to
discourage REM because of its negative consequences for firm value and future performance.
At firms with low institutional ownership, the lack of this external monitoring makes it easier
for managers to inflate current earnings myopically via REM (Bushee 1998; Roychowdhury
2006). We thus expect the decline in litigation risk after the court ruling to lead to greater
increases in REM at Ninth Circuit firms with lower institutional ownership.
As in Bebchuk et al. (2009), we use the entrenchment index (E-Index) to capture
managerial entrenchment. E-Index is based on six provisions, four of which constitute
limitations on shareholders’ voting power and the remaining two are measures against hostile
takeovers. To conduct this test, we augment equation (1) with the following terms: E-Index,
Post*E-Index, Ninth Circuit*E-Index, and Post*Ninth Circuit*E-Index. In this specification
reported in Table 8, Panel A the coefficient on Post*Ninth Circuit*E-Index is significant and
positive in all three columns, implying that post-ruling increases in REM at the Ninth Circuit
firms are stronger when managers are more entrenched.
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE]
To test how changes in REM depend on institutional ownership, we expand equation
(1) to supplement the main effect of institutional owners (IO) with the following interaction
terms: Post*IO, Ninth Circuit*IO, and Post*Ninth Circuit*IO. Table 8, Panel B reports the
results of this test in columns (1) through (3). The coefficient on Post*Ninth Circuit*IO is
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negative and significant with AbnProd and RM as dependent variables, providing some support
for our prediction that the post-ruling increases in REM at the Ninth Circuit firms are stronger
when institutional ownership is lower. We next explore the role of institutional owners in more
depth by focusing on ownership of those institutions that are known to monitor and exert
positive influence on the firm’s governance: dedicated investors and quasi-indexers (Bushee
1998; Appel, Gormley and Keim 2016). We repeat our tests replacing IO with IO_Monitor
which is computed as the percentage of shares owned by dedicated investors and quasi-indexers
divided by the percentage of shares owned by all institutional investors. The results are reported
in columns (4) - (6) of Table 8, Panel B. In all three columns the coefficient on Post*Ninth
Circuit*IO_Monitor is negative and statistically significant with p-values less than 0.05. These
results indicate that higher ownership by institutions known to exert positive influence on the
firm’s governance constrained post-ruling increases in REM at the Ninth-Circuit firms.

ADDITIONAL ANALYSES

Results on Changes in REM and Accrual-Based Earnings Management
Although we control for accruals management in all our tests, in this section we test for
an interacted effect: does REM increase more for those Ninth Circuit firms that report high
discretionary accruals following the ruling? As a preliminary analysis, we test whether accruals
management in Ninth Circuit exhibits an increase relative to that of control firms following the
ruling. Figure 1, Panel B plots abnormal accruals in event time. As the figure reveals, abnormal
accruals exhibits a significant increase in year 2 following the ruling but the difference in
abnormal accruals between treatment and control firms is not significant in years 3 and 4.
Turning to our main analysis in this section, we augment our main model to include
not only AbnAcc, but also its interaction terms with Post, Ninth Circuit, and Post*Ninth Circuit.
Table 9 reports the results from these tests. The coefficients on Post*Ninth Circuit* AbnAcc
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are significantly negative in all three columns, implying that REM increases more for Ninth
Circuit firms with lower discretionary accruals. Together with the results in Hopkins (2017),
those in Table 9 suggest that REM and accruals both increased following the ruling but the
increases were negatively correlated in the cross-section of Ninth Circuit firms. In further
untabulated tests, we find that increases in REM were particularly pronounced for Ninth Circuit
firms that had limited ability to manipulate accruals, as measured by high net operating assets
(Barton and Simko 2002; Zang 2012). 26
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE]

Results on the Importance of Firm-Specific Litigation Risk
Prior literature documents that litigation risk can vary across firms based on
characteristics such as industry membership, return volatility and growth (Francis, Philbrick
and Schipper 1995; Rogers and Stocken 2005; Kim and Skinner 2012). We expect that
increases in REM accompanying the Ninth Circuit court ruling should be the most pronounced
for firms most constrained by litigation risk in the year before the ruling.
We modify equation (1) to include a firm-specific litigation risk measure (LitRisk)
introduced by Kim and Skinner (2012), along with its interaction terms with the following
variables: Post, Ninth Circuit, and Post*Ninth Circuit. Table 10 presents the results. The
coefficient on Post*Ninth Circuit* LitRisk is positive and statistically significant in the first
two columns, providing some support for the notion that greater post-ruling REM increases in
Ninth Circuit firms occur at those firms that were more constrained by litigation risk before the
ruling. 27
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Firms with high net operating assets (NOA) do not show significant increases in abnormal accruals following
the ruling. The evidence is consistent with high-NOA firms having reduced flexibility to increase, or even sustain
aggressive accrual choices following the ruling and resorting to REM instead.
27
Our results are stronger and statistically significant in all three columns when we replace continuous LitRisk
with a binary variable HighLitRisk which takes the value of one for firms with above median LitRisk, suggesting
that the effect of firm-specific litigation risk is not perfectly linear.
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[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE]

Other Untabulated Analyses
REM Escalation: In untabulated analyses, we examine whether the decline in litigation risk
following the 1999 ruling motivated managers to escalate the level of REM from year to year.
In the presence of litigation risk, we expect managers to limit any escalation of REM escalation
from one period to the next, out of concern that this escalation can cause them to issue
misleading statements that, upon being uncovered, attract class action lawsuits. Thus,
following the decline in litigation risk with the 1999 ruling, we expect Ninth Circuit firms to
exhibit greater REM escalation relative to other firms. To measure REM escalation we use an
indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm moves from tercile 1 of an REM proxy last year to tercile
2 or 3 in the current year for that proxy; or moves from tercile 2 of last year to tercile 3 in the
current year; or belonged to tercile 3 last year and remains in tercile 3 in the current year.
Untabulated results confirm that Ninth Circuit firms exhibit greater year-to-year escalation in
REM following the decline in litigation risk with the 1999 ruling.

Derivative Lawsuits and Real Earnings Management: To increase the generalizability of our
results, we next examine shocks to the ability of shareholders to file derivative lawsuits. Unlike
the Ninth Circuit Court ruling, shocks to the filing of derivative lawsuits were staggered over
time, which addresses potential concerns that the deterrence effect of litigation on REM is
limited to one specific time-period or event. 28 Staggered adoption of universal demand (UD)
laws in 23 states between 1989 and 2005 made the filing of derivative lawsuits significantly
more difficult by requiring that shareholders seek the board’s approval before initiating
litigation (Appel 2016). The passage of UD laws reduced the incidence of litigation and
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Derivative lawsuits allow shareholders to sue managers and/or directors on behalf of the corporation (rather
than on behalf of shareholders) for a breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs almost always prefer securities class
action litigation but derivative lawsuits are often filed in addition whenever there are legal grounds for initiating
both (Erickson 2010; Appel 2016)
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contributed to poorer governance and higher cost of capital for affected firms (Appel 2016;
Houston, Lin and Xie 2015). We create a sample of firm years encompassing years 1985-2009,
which ranges from four years before the first state adoption of UD laws to four years after the
last state adoption. Untabulated results from staggered differences-in-differences tests centered
on UD law adoption reveal significant increases in REM for firms when their respective states
of incorporation adopt UD laws. Consistent with our main results based on securities class
action litigation, we conclude that litigation serves a deterrence role with respect to real
earnings management and that REM increases when that role is reduced.

CONCLUSION
Shareholders can pursue various courses of action to prevent managers from violating
their fiduciary duty and engaging in actions that transfer wealth away from shareholders. These
actions include exercising governance through vote or exit (Parrino et al. 2003; Edmans 2009;
Edmans and Manso 2011; Appel, Gormley and Keim 2016). In certain circumstances,
shareholders are also able to file lawsuits against the firm’s management and/or directors.
Because litigation has serious reputation and career implications for management and directors
(Srinivasan 2005; Brochet and Srinivasan 2014), it also serves a deterrence role. While prior
literature has investigated the disciplining effect of litigation on management forecasts, as well
as GAAP violations (Skinner 1994; Houston et al. 2015; Hopkins 2017), no prior research has
explored whether this effect of litigation extends to real earnings management (REM).
Establishing whether it does is important because the impact of REM on future performance is
known to be more negative than that of accruals and at the same time, REM is more opaque
and difficult to litigate against because of the business judgment principle.
In this paper, we provide robust evidence that litigation deters REM. Our results further
indicate that litigation’s deterrence effect arises because of REM’s link with excessively
optimistic disclosures. Managers that manipulate real actions bear the risk that they have to
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misrepresent the true intent and circumstances underlying those actions and these
misrepresentations can become subject to lawsuits. Further, we find that litigation’s role in
deterring REM is more salient when managerial incentives to overstate earnings are stronger
and corporate governance is weaker.
We caution that our findings need not imply that an increase in litigation risk is
necessarily the most efficient way to constrain managerial opportunism under all
circumstances. For example, Lin et al. (2017) find that the threat of litigation can constrain
risk-taking and innovation, which suggests that increased litigation risk imposes costs. Our
results should be interpreted as indicating a partial benefit of litigation risk. When managers
face short-term incentives to myopically inflate earnings, the prospect of ex post settling up via
litigation effectively deters real earnings management. A second caveat to bear in mind is that
the effects of a decline in litigation risk with the 1999 ruling may not necessarily have been
permanent. As Crane and Koch (2018) note, alternative governance mechanisms such as higher
institutional ownership possibly stepped in to discipline the expected increase in managerial
opportunism and myopia in Ninth Circuit firms after the 1999 ruling. However, if any of these
governance changes were unconditionally optimal, they could have taken place even when
litigation risk was high, that is, prior to the ruling. An increase in REM, even one that is the
strongest in the year immediately following the ruling, implies that litigation risk constrains
myopic real actions that would be costlier to discipline via alternative governance mechanisms.
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Appendix A Variable Definitions
Variables
Ninth Circuit
Post
ROA
Total Assets
Firm Size
Dividend
CAPEX
Leverage
Cash
Debt Issue
Equity Issue
Acquisition
IO
IO_Monitor
GDP Growth
Unemployment
Income
Population
Gender
Ethnicity
Education
Vote Democrat

AbnProd

Definition
Indicator equal to one if firms are located in Ninth Circuit States. Source: Compustat.
Indicator equal to one for years 2000-2003, and zero for years 1995-1998. Source:
Compustat
Operating income over lagged total asset. Source: Compustat
Total assets (in million). Source: Compustat
Log of total assets. Source: Compustat
Dividend over total assets. Source: Compustat
Capital expenditures over total assets. Source: Compustat
Short term debt plus long term debt, divided by total assets. Source: Compustat
Cash over total assets. Source: Compustat
Long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction, divided by total assets.
Source: Compustat
Sale of common stock, divided by shareholder equity. Source: Compustat
Number of acquisitions. Source: SDC
Percent of shares outstanding held by institutional investors. Source: Thomson Reuters
Percentage of shares owned by dedicated investors and quasi-indexers divided by the
percentage of shares owned by all institutional investors.
State GDP growth rate. Source: Census.
County unemployment rate. Source: Census.
County income per capita. Source: Census.
Log of County population. Source: Census.
Percentage of female population at County level. Source: Census.
Percentage of white population at County level. Source: Census.
Percentage of people with at least tertiary education at County level. Source: Census.
Percentage of people voting for the Democratic candidate in the last presidential
election. Source: Census.
Following Kothari et al. (2016), we estimate abnormal production cost as residuals
from the following first-order autoregressive model incorporating fixed-effects:
Prodi,t = α0+ α1Prodi,t-1 +α2 1 / Assetsi,t-1 + α3Salesi,t + α4∆Salesi,t + α5∆Salesi,t1 + εi,t
Where Prodi,t is the sum of COGS and change in inventory during the year scaled by
lagged total assets; Prodi,t-1 is its lagged value; Assetsi,t-1 is lagged total assets;
Salesi,t is sales during the year scaled by lagged total assets; ∆Salesi,t is the sale
growth scaled by lagged total assets; ∆Salesi,t-1 is its lagged value.
To control for year-specific and firm-specific effects that induce model
misspecification, we adapt the model proposed by Kothari et al. (2016) for estimating
abnormal production cost. As described in Kothari et al. (2016): “First, every firm’s
production cost is differenced from the cross-sectional mean for that year. Second, for
every firm, the annual deviation of production cost from the cross-sectional mean is
differenced from the corresponding deviation in the previous year. The explanatory
variables in the model are also differenced twice in the same manner. The model is
estimated every year.” The firm-year residual minus the mean value of the residual
across all years for the corresponding firm yields abnormal production costs. Source:
Compustat.
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Appendix A Variable Definitions, Continued

AbnDisx

RM

AbnAcc

D(t=-1)
D(t=-2)
D(t=-3)
D(t=1)
D(t=2)
D(t=3)
D(t=4)

OptTone_MDA

OptTone_EPR

Optimistic
Forecast
Optimistic
Disclosure

Following Kothari et al. (2016), we estimate abnormal discretionary expenditures as
residuals from the following first-order autoregressive model incorporating fixedeffects:
DiscExpi,t = α0+ α1 DiscExpi,t-1+ α2 1 / Assetsi,t-1 + α3 Salesi,t + εi,t .
Where DiscExpi,t is the sum of advertising expenses, R&D expenses and SG&A
expenses, all scaled by lagged total assets; DiscExpi,t-1 is its lagged value; Assetsi,t-1 is
lagged total assets; Salesi,t is sales during the year scaled by lagged total assets.
Please see notes on AbnProd for a description of how the model is estimated. Following
Kothari et al. (2016), “the firm-year residual minus the mean value of the residual across
all years for the corresponding firm, times minus one, yields abnormal discretionary
expense or AbnDisx for that firm-year. Higher values of AbnDisx represent greater cuts
in discretionary expenses and more earnings management.” Source: Compustat.
AbnDisx + AbnProd
Following Kothari et al. (2016), we estimate abnormal discretionary accruals with a
fixed-effect first-order autoregressive model:
TAi,t = α0 + α1 TAi,t-1 + α2 1 / Assetsi,t-1 +α3∆Revi,t+ α4PPEi,t + α5CFOi,t-1 + α6CFOi,t +
α7CFOi,t+1 +εi,t
Where TAi,t is total accruals of firm i in year t, scaled by average total assets; TAi,t-1 is
its lagged value; ∆Revi,t is the annual change in revenues scaled by average total assets;
PPEi,t is property, plant, and equipment scaled by average total assets; CFO is operating
cash flow, scaled by average total assets.
Please see notes on AbnProd for a description of how the model is estimated. Source:
Compustat.
An indicator equal to one for year 1998, and zero otherwise. Source: Compustat.
An indicator equal to one for year 1997, and zero otherwise. Source: Compustat.
An indicator equal to one for year 1996, and zero otherwise. Source: Compustat.
An indicator equal to one for year 2000, and zero otherwise. Source: Compustat.
An indicator equal to one for year 2001, and zero otherwise. Source: Compustat.
An indicator equal to one for year 2002, and zero otherwise. Source: Compustat.
An indicator equal to one for year 2003, and zero otherwise. Source: Compustat.
An indicator equal to one if abnormal tone of the Management and Discussion Section
(MD&A) of the 10-Ks is positive, and zero otherwise. Tone is measured as the
difference between the count of positive and negative words scaled by the total number
of words following the Loughran and McDonald (2011) methodology. Abnormal tone
is measured following Huang, Teoh and Zhang (2014) as a residual from a regression
of tone on earnings, returns, size, book-to-market, volatility of returns and earnings,
firm age, number of business and geographic segments, the incidence of losses, change
in earnings, analyst forecast of earnings and analyst forecast error. Source: MD&A Tone
data from Bochkay and Levine (2017), generously provided by Khrystyna Bochkay at
U. of Miami, Compustat, CRSP, IBES.
An indicator takes the value of one if abnormal tone of earnings announcement press
releases is positive, and zero otherwise. Abnormal tone is measured following Huang,
Teoh and Zhang (2014) following the same procedure as in OptTone_MDA. Source:
Earnings press-release tone data from Huang, Teoh and Zhang (2014) generously
provided by Siew Hong Teoh at U. of California, Irvine, Compustat, CRSP, IBES.
An indicator equal to one if the last annual management forecast before fiscal year end
beats median analyst consensus computed over the past 90 days. Source: First Call.
An indicator equal to one if abnormal tone in the MD&A or the earnings press release
was positive, or the manager issued an optimistic forecast prior to the fiscal year-end,
and zero otherwise.
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Appendix A Variable Definitions, Continued

Narrow Beat

Large Beat

Narrow Miss

Insider Net Sell

E-index
LitRisk

I(AbnDisx_ESC),
I(AbnProd_ESC),
I(RM_ESC)

Post(UD)
UD

An indicator equal to one if actual EPS meets or beats earnings target by less than 2
cents, and zero otherwise. We define earnings target using analyst consensus forecasts
within first 90 days since the last earnings announcement. For firms without analyst
coverage, we define earnings target using earnings from last year. Source: IBES.
An indicator equal to one if actual EPS meets or beats earnings target by at least 2 cents,
and zero otherwise. We define earnings target using analyst consensus forecasts within
first 90 days since the last earnings announcement. For firms without analyst coverage,
we define earnings target using earnings from last year. Source: IBES.
An indicator equal to one if actual EPS misses earnings target by less than 2 cents, and
zero otherwise. We define earnings target using analyst consensus forecasts within first
90 days since the last earnings announcement. For firms without analyst coverage, we
define earnings target using earnings from last year. Source: IBES.
Insider sales minus insider purchases if insider sales are greater than insider purchases
and zero otherwise. Insider sales (purchases) are computed as the percentage of shares
sold (purchased) by executives. Insider executives exclude directors and large owners
(that is, those with >10% block-holdings), and include officers of the firm such as CEOs,
CFOs, COOs, Senior VPs, and VPs. We follow Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012)
and exclude routine transactions in calculating insider sales and purchases. Source:
Thomson Reuters.
E-Index is based on six provisions, four of which constitute limitations on shareholders’
voting power and the remaining two are measures against hostile takeovers. Source:
IRRC.
LitRisk is the estimated litigation probability from Kim and Skinner (2012) model.
Source: Compustat.
Indicator variable for year-to-year escalation in REM. Firms are partitioned every year
into three equal-sized groups (terciles) based on the corresponding REM metric. We
define an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm moves from tercile 1 of REM last year
to tercile 2 or 3 in the current year; or moves from tercile 2 of last year to tercile 3 in the
current year; or belonged to tercile 3 last year and remains in tercile 3 in the current
year. Source: Compustat
An indicator equal to one for all years after a state passes the UD law, and zero
otherwise. Source: Compustat.
An indicator variable for a “UD state”; that is, equal to one if a state eventually passes
UD law for a firm in that state, and zero otherwise. Source: Compustat.
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Figure 1 Parallel Trends: RM and AbnAcc
Figure 1 plots the changes in RM (AbnAcc) in year t relative to the year t-4. X-axis represents event year where
t=0 is the year of the Ninth Circuit Ruling. We plot residual RM (AbnAcc) from the regression of RM (AbnAcc)
on all control variables (other than Post*Ninth Circuit) in Equation (1). The sample period is from 1995 to 2003,
excluding 1999, the year of the Ninth Circuit ruling. We exclude the financial and utility industries (sic 40004999 and sic 6000-6999). We exclude penny stocks (share price less than one dollar) and firms with missing state
of headquarter location. Only firms with at least one year of data in both the pre- and post-event periods are
included in the sample. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively for ttest of difference in means between treated and control firms in year t.

Panel A Parallel Trend-RM

Panel B Parallel Trend-AbnAcc
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
The sample period is from 1995 to 2003, excluding 1999, the year of the Ninth Circuit ruling. We exclude the
financial and utility industries (sic 4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999). We exclude penny stocks (share price less than
one dollar) and firms with missing state of headquarter location. Only firms with at least one year of data in both
the pre- and post-event periods are included in the sample. All variables are defined in Appendix A.

AbnDisx
AbnProd
RM
Ninth Circuit
ROA
Total Assets(Million)
Dividend
CAPEX
Leverage
Cash
Debt Issue
Equity Issue
Acquisition
IO
AbnAcc
GDP Growth
Unemployment
Income
Population
Gender
Ethnicity
Education
Vote Democrat

N
15225
14958
14215
15225
15225
15225
15225
15225
15225
15225
15225
15225
15225
15225
15225
15225
15225
15225
15225
15225
15225
15225
15225

Mean
0.004
0.001
0.004
0.169
0.099
1275.5
0.007
0.062
0.236
0.164
0.012
0.038
0.035
0.370
0.000
4.387
0.029
16.886
2.933
0.504
0.845
0.217
0.444

Median
0.027
0.014
0.031
0.000
0.133
199.8
0.000
0.042
0.195
0.071
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.347
0.004
3.125
0.029
14.020
2.970
0.506
0.871
0.219
0.444
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Std
0.142
0.137
0.197
0.375
0.286
3154.2
0.017
0.066
0.243
0.209
0.095
1.101
0.184
0.281
0.104
4.562
0.004
13.012
0.821
0.008
0.086
0.036
0.069

P25
-0.030
-0.038
-0.044
0.000
0.060
49.2
0.000
0.022
0.027
0.020
-0.017
-0.010
0.000
0.099
-0.039
-0.059
0.027
6.758
2.378
0.499
0.775
0.194
0.414

P75
0.065
0.059
0.091
0.000
0.205
823.3
0.008
0.076
0.357
0.229
0.023
0.017
0.000
0.610
0.045
7.850
0.033
21.906
3.633
0.510
0.927
0.237
0.478

Table 2 – Univariate Tests
The sample period is from 1995 to 2003, excluding 1999, the year of the Ninth Circuit ruling. We exclude the financial and utility industries (sic 4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999).
We exclude penny stocks (share price less than one dollar) and firms with missing state of headquarter location. Only firms with at least one year of data in both the pre- and
post-event periods are included in the sample. This table reports the univariate comparison between firms located in Ninth Circuit States and those in other circuit states. All
variables are defined in Appendix A.

AbnDisx
AbnProd
RM

Panel A Ninth Circuit States
Before
After
-0.004
0.010
-0.006
0.014
-0.001
0.007

p-value
0.032
0.002
0.368

Panel B Other Circuit States
Before
After
p-value
0.025
-0.016
0.000
-0.003
0.003
0.005
0.020
-0.012
0.000
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Panel C Diff-in-Diff
diff-in-diff
p-value
0.027
0.000
0.013
0.000
0.040
0.000

Table 3 Real Earnings Management (REM) Changes
Table 3 examines changes in REM following the Ninth Circuit court ruling. The sample period is from 1995 to
2003, excluding 1999, the year of the Ninth Circuit ruling. We exclude the financial and utility industries (sic
4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999). We exclude penny stocks (share price less than one dollar) and firms with missing
state of headquarter location. Only firms with at least one year of data in both the pre- and post-event periods are
included in the sample. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients
within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard
errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at state of location level.

Post*Ninth Circuit
ROA
Firm Size
Dividend
CAPEX
Leverage
Cash
Debt Issue
Equity Issue
Acquisition
IO
AbnAcc
GDP Growth
Unemployment
Income
Population
Gender
Ethnicity
Education
Vote Democrat

Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE

(1)
AbnDisx

(2)
AbnProd

(3)
RM

0.016
(3.97)***
0.158
(5.29)***
0.013
(2.48)**
0.043
(0.38)
0.050
(1.34)
0.056
(2.85)***
0.067
(2.66)**
-0.150
(-6.75)***
-0.004
(-1.16)
0.005
(0.86)
-0.018
(-1.29)
0.058
(2.11)**
-0.000
(-0.09)
-0.191
(-0.19)
0.001
(1.61)
-0.002
(-0.10)
-1.207
(-1.18)
-0.236
(-1.91)*
0.635
(2.21)**
-0.053
(-0.72)

0.013
(2.03)**
-0.155
(-7.03)***
0.009
(1.33)
0.205
(1.57)
0.093
(2.50)**
-0.037
(-2.65)**
-0.014
(-0.76)
0.093
(5.63)***
0.001
(0.55)
0.012
(1.25)
-0.016
(-0.95)
0.106
(3.14)***
0.001
(0.71)
1.201
(0.70)
-0.001
(-1.19)
-0.010
(-0.50)
0.469
(0.43)
0.299
(2.54)**
-0.505
(-1.60)
-0.097
(-1.20)

0.023
(3.66)***
-0.001
(-0.04)
0.022
(2.45)**
0.218
(1.08)
0.117
(2.69)***
0.010
(0.35)
0.020
(0.60)
-0.032
(-1.25)
-0.002
(-0.41)
0.010
(0.84)
-0.038
(-1.57)
0.176
(3.89)***
0.001
(0.67)
0.621
(0.30)
0.000
(0.24)
-0.013
(-0.77)
-1.803
(-1.14)
-0.128
(-0.69)
0.605
(1.03)
-0.049
(-0.46)

15,225
0.420
Yes
Yes

14,958
0.312
Yes
Yes

14,215
0.405
Yes
Yes
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Table 4 Real Earnings Management (REM) Changes: Parallel Trends Analysis
Table 4 examines changes in REM in in year t relative to the year of the Ninth Circuit court ruling. The sample
period is from 1995 to 2003, excluding 1999, the year of the Ninth Circuit ruling. We exclude the financial and
utility industries (sic 4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999). We exclude penny stocks (share price less than one dollar)
and firms with missing state of headquarter location. Only firms with at least one year of data in both the pre- and
post-event periods are included in the sample. All regressions contain the same set of control variables as in Table
3. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses.
*, ** and *** denote two-tailed significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected
for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at state of location level.

D(t=-3)*Ninth Circuit
D(t=-2)*Ninth Circuit
D(t=-1)*Ninth Circuit
D(t=1)*Ninth Circuit
D(t=2)*Ninth Circuit
D(t=3)*Ninth Circuit
D(t=4)*Ninth Circuit

Controls
Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE

(1)
AbnDisx

(2)
AbnProd

(3)
RM

-0.009
(-0.89)
0.008
(0.68)
0.011
(0.83)
0.026
(2.53)**
0.045
(2.86)***
0.009
(0.92)
-0.000
(-0.03)

0.016
(1.38)
0.004
(0.46)
0.018
(1.40)
0.029
(2.54)**
0.014
(1.24)
0.005
(0.50)
0.030
(1.70)*

0.018
(1.60)
0.020
(1.19)
0.035
(1.20)
0.050
(2.50)**
0.057
(2.77)***
0.031
(1.77)*
0.036
(2.53)**

Yes
15,225
0.427
Yes
Yes

Yes
14,958
0.313
Yes
Yes

Yes
14,215
0.407
Yes
Yes
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Table 5 Real Earnings Management (REM) Changes and Propensity Score Matching
Panel A gauges matching quality of the dependent and independent variables for the propensity score matched
treatment and control samples. Panel B provides univariate comparison of REM for both the pre- and the postruling periods. Panel C estimates Eq. (1) using this propensity score matched sample. The sample period is from
1995 to 2003, excluding 1999, the year of the Ninth Circuit ruling. We exclude the financial and utility industries
(sic 4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999). We exclude penny stocks (share price less than one dollar) and firms with
missing state of headquarter location. Only firms with at least one year of data in both the pre- and post-event
periods are included in the sample. All regressions contain the same set of control variables as in Table 3. All
variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **
and *** denote two-tailed significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for
heteroscedasticity and are clustered at state of location level.

AbnDisx
AbnProd
RM
PSM Score
ROA
Firm Size
Dividend
CAPEX
Leverage
Cash
Debt Issue
Equity Issue
Acquisition
IO
AbnAcc

Abndisx
Abnprod
RM

Abndisx
Abnprod
RM

Post*Ninth Circuit

Controls
Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE

Panel A Matching Quality
Control
Treated
0.002
0.025
-0.004
0.019
-0.005
0.041
0.199
0.199
0.084
0.097
4.949
5.078
0.005
0.005
0.067
0.068
0.208
0.213
0.222
0.214
0.016
0.016
0.030
0.063
0.045
0.043
0.330
0.341
-0.002
-0.003
Panel B Univariate Comparison
Pre-Ruling Period
Control
Treated
0.015
0.012
-0.008
-0.004
0.004
0.005
Post-Ruling Period
Control
Treated
-0.023
0.050
0.004
0.065
-0.022
0.111
Panel C Multivariate Regression
(1)
(2)
AbnDisx
AbnProd

p-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.987
0.203
0.058
0.910
0.944
0.574
0.348
0.852
0.518
0.798
0.254
0.646

p-value
0.669
0.539
0.926
p-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
(3)
RM

0.030
(2.44)**

0.025
(1.93)*

0.056
(2.58)**

Yes
3,276
0.728
Yes
Yes

Yes
3,276
0.684
Yes
Yes

Yes
3,276
0.704
Yes
Yes
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Table 6 Real Earnings Management (REM) and Optimistic/Misleading Disclosure
Table 6 examines cross-sectional variation in changes in REM following the Ninth Circuit court ruling with
optimistic disclosures. Panel A and B examine the abnormal optimistic tone of MD&A section of 10-K and of the
earnings press release, respectively. Panel C focuses on optimistic management forecasts. Panel D focuses on a
composite measure of optimistic disclosure. The sample period is from 1995 to 2003, excluding 1999, the year of
the Ninth Circuit ruling. We exclude the financial and utility industries (sic 4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999). We
exclude penny stocks (share price less than one dollar) and firms with missing state of headquarter location. Only
firms with at least one year of data in both the pre- and post-event periods are included in the sample. All
regressions contain the same set of control variables as in Table 3. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Tstatistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed significance
level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at
state of location level.
Panel A Optimistic Tone in the MD&A
(1)
(2)
(3)
AbnDisx
AbnProd
RM
Post*Ninth Circuit

0.039
(1.62)
0.019
(0.59)
-0.009
(-1.13)
-0.008
(-0.37)
0.010
(1.57)

Post*Ninth Circuit*OptTone_MDA
Post*OptTone_MDA
Ninth Circuit*OptTone_MDA
OptTone_MDA

Controls
Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE

0.021
(1.54)
0.054
(3.06)***
-0.014
(-1.36)
-0.039
(-2.66)**
0.010
(1.39)

Yes
Yes
4,803
4,733
0.522
0.469
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Panel B Optimistic Tone in the Earnings Press Release
(1)
(2)
AbnDisx
AbnProd

Post*Ninth Circuit
Post*Ninth Circuit*OptTone_EPR
Post*OptTone_EPR
Ninth Circuit*OptTone_EPR
OptTone_EPR

Controls
Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE
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0.019
(0.99)
0.038
(1.73)*
-0.026
(-2.11)**
-0.052
(-2.23)**
0.023
(2.50)**
Yes
4,459
0.498
Yes
Yes
(3)
RM

-0.021
(-0.66)
0.120
(2.34)**
-0.010
(-0.50)
-0.115
(-2.50)**
0.008
(0.46)

-0.069
(-3.02)***
0.131
(3.18)***
0.009
(0.28)
-0.110
(-2.85)***
-0.016
(-0.51)

-0.049
(-0.92)
0.189
(2.42)**
-0.003
(-0.08)
-0.164
(-2.24)**
-0.008
(-0.21)

Yes
3,954
0.707
Yes
Yes

Yes
3,901
0.621
Yes
Yes

Yes
3,717
0.700
Yes
Yes

Table 6 Real Earnings Management (REM) and Optimistic/Misleading Disclosure, Ctd.

Panel C Optimistic Forecast
(1)
AbnDisx

(2)
AbnProd

(3)
RM

0.013
(3.28)***
0.065
(1.71)*
0.008
(1.08)
0.011
(0.30)
-0.011
(-1.91)*

0.013
(1.75)*
0.035
(1.64)
0.008
(0.86)
-0.017
(-0.78)
-0.001
(-0.14)

0.020
(3.10)***
0.099
(3.24)***
0.012
(0.96)
-0.014
(-0.67)
-0.009
(-0.93)

Yes
15,225
0.426
Yes
Yes
Panel D Optimistic Disclosure
(1)
AbnDisx
Post*Ninth Circuit
0.007
(1.54)
Post*Ninth Circuit*Optimistic Disclosure
0.036
(4.63)***
Post*Optimistic Disclosure
-0.000
(-0.09)
Ninth Circuit*Optimistic Disclosure
-0.027
(-4.46)***
Optimistic Disclosure
0.001
(0.29)

Yes
14,958
0.312
Yes
Yes

Yes
14,215
0.407
Yes
Yes

(2)
AbnProd
0.003
(0.37)
0.032
(2.97)***
-0.004
(-0.60)
-0.009
(-1.09)
-0.006
(-1.03)

(3)
RM
0.007
(0.97)
0.061
(4.86)***
-0.011
(-1.54)
-0.044
(-3.94)***
0.002
(0.38)

Yes
14,958
0.312
Yes
Yes

Yes
14,215
0.407
Yes
Yes

Post*Ninth Circuit
Post*Ninth Circuit*Optimistic Forecast
Post*Optimistic Forecast
Ninth Circuit*Optimistic Forecast
Optimistic Forecast

Controls
Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE

Controls
Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE

Yes
15,225
0.426
Yes
Yes
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Table 7 Real Earnings Management (REM) and Short-Term Incentives
Table 7 examines cross-sectional variation in changes in REM following the Ninth Circuit court ruling with shortterm incentives to overstate earnings. Panel A studies the incentives to meet or beat earnings target while Panel B
studies the incentives arising from insider selling. The sample period is from 1995 to 2003, excluding 1999, the
year of the Ninth Circuit ruling. We exclude the financial and utility industries (sic 4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999).
We exclude penny stocks (share price less than one dollar) and firms with missing state of headquarter location.
Only firms with at least one year of data in both the pre- and post-event periods are included in the sample. All
regressions contain the same set of control variables as in Table 3. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Tstatistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed significance
level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at
state of location level.
Panel A REM and Meet Beat
(1)
AbnDisx
Post*Ninth Circuit
Post*Ninth Circuit*Narrow Beat
Post*Ninth Circuit*Large Beat
Post*Ninth Circuit*Narrow Miss
Post*Narrow Beat
Ninth Circuit*Narrow Beat
Post*Large Beat
Ninth Circuit*Large Beat
Post*Narrow Miss
Ninth Circuit*Narrow Miss
Narrow Beat
Large Beat
Narrow Miss

Controls
Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE
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(2)
AbnProd

(3)
RM

0.005
(1.03)
0.024
(1.85)*
0.019
(3.80)***
-0.033
(-2.38)**
-0.007
(-0.91)
0.018
(1.84)*
-0.002
(-0.37)
0.013
(1.64)
-0.002
(-0.14)
0.010
(0.77)
0.011
(2.11)**
-0.001
(-0.41)
0.005
(0.99)

0.002
(0.25)
0.028
(1.75)*
0.020
(2.29)**
0.011
(0.26)
-0.014
(-1.38)
0.002
(0.14)
0.004
(0.86)
-0.007
(-1.36)
0.001
(0.08)
0.018
(1.55)
-0.002
(-0.27)
-0.019
(-4.09)***
-0.014
(-1.73)*

0.005
(0.54)
0.094
(3.24)***
0.028
(2.89)***
-0.042
(-1.92)*
-0.024
(-1.78)*
-0.012
(-0.67)
0.004
(0.50)
-0.004
(-0.36)
-0.007
(-0.47)
0.011
(0.73)
0.008
(1.19)
-0.018
(-2.85)***
-0.005
(-0.49)

Yes
15,225
0.427
Yes
Yes

Yes
14,958
0.315
Yes
Yes

Yes
14,215
0.409
Yes
Yes

Table 7 Real Earnings Management (REM) and Short-Term Incentives, Ctd.
Panel B REM and Insider Selling
(1)
AbnDisx
Post*Ninth Circuit
Post*Ninth Circuit*Insider Net Sell
Post*Insider Net Sell
Ninth Circuit*Insider Net Sell
Insider Net Sell

Controls
Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE
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(2)
AbnProd

(3)
RM

0.011
(2.77)***
0.041
(3.38)***
-0.001
(-0.19)
-0.010
(-1.43)
-0.010
(-3.60)***

0.012
(1.65)
0.020
(2.10)**
0.010
(1.79)*
0.002
(0.19)
-0.001
(-0.14)

0.016
(2.33)**
0.070
(5.17)***
-0.006
(-0.53)
-0.014
(-1.77)*
-0.006
(-1.39)

Yes
15,225
0.427
Yes
Yes

Yes
14,958
0.313
Yes
Yes

Yes
14,215
0.408
Yes
Yes

Table 8 Real Earnings Management (REM) Changes and Corporate Governance
Table 8 examines cross-sectional variation in changes in REM following the Ninth Circuit court ruling with
corporate governance attributes. Panel A studies the role of managerial entrenchment while Panel B studies the
role of institutional ownership. The sample period is from 1995 to 2003, excluding 1999, the year of the Ninth
Circuit ruling. We exclude the financial and utility industries (sic 4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999). We exclude
penny stocks (share price less than one dollar) and firms with missing state of headquarter location. Only firms
with at least one year of data in both the pre- and post-event periods are included in the sample. All regressions
contain the same set of control variables as in Table 3. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are
presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed significance level at 10%,
5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at state of location
level.
Panel A Managerial Entrenchment
(1)
(2)
(3)
AbnDisx
AbnProd
RM
Post*Ninth Circuit
Post*Ninth Circuit*E-Index
Post*E-Index
Ninth Circuit*E-Index
E-Index

-0.010
(-1.17)
0.009
(3.20)***
0.000
(0.31)
-0.009
(-2.59)**
0.003
(0.87)

-0.031
(-1.23)
0.012
(2.08)**
-0.003
(-1.40)
0.007
(0.96)
0.005
(1.89)*

-0.041
(-1.53)
0.020
(2.32)**
-0.001
(-0.61)
0.005
(0.56)
0.007
(1.38)

Controls
Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE

Yes
Yes
Yes
4,701
4,631
4,538
0.485
0.308
0.433
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Panel B Institutional Ownership
InstOwn = IO
InstOwn = IO_Monitor
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
AbnDisx
AbnProd
RM
AbnDisx
AbnProd
RM

Post*Ninth Circuit*InstOwn

0.021
(2.02)**
-0.004
(-0.13)
0.026
(2.22)**
-0.043
(-1.06)
-0.027
(-2.01)**

0.038
(2.95)***
-0.066
(-2.68)***
0.005
(0.49)
0.032
(0.60)
-0.017
(-1.39)

0.054
(3.73)***
-0.074
(-1.83)*
0.024
(1.50)
-0.003
(-0.03)
-0.044
(-2.33)**

0.063
(4.04)***
-0.066
(-3.04)***
0.006
(0.54)
0.003
(0.19)
0.036
(2.88)***

0.066
(2.16)**
-0.076
(-2.13)**
-0.010
(-0.87)
0.020
(0.92)
0.004
(0.39)

0.102
(5.24)***
-0.110
(-4.19)***
-0.010
(-0.64)
-0.015
(-0.65)
0.052
(3.30)***

Yes
15,225
0.421
Yes
Yes

Yes
14,958
0.312
Yes
Yes

Yes
14,215
0.405
Yes
Yes

Yes
15,225
0.428
Yes
Yes

Yes
14,958
0.313
Yes
Yes

Yes
14,215
0.408
Yes
Yes

Post*InstOwn
Ninth Circuit* InstOwn
InstOwn
Post*Ninth Circuit*InstOwn

Controls
Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE
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Table 9 Real Earnings Management (REM) and Accrual Earnings Management
Table 9 examines cross-sectional variation in changes in REM following the Ninth Circuit court ruling with
accrual-based earnings management (AbnAcc). The sample period is from 1995 to 2003, excluding 1999, the year
of the Ninth Circuit ruling. We exclude the financial and utility industries (sic 4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999). We
exclude penny stocks (share price less than one dollar) and firms with missing state of headquarter location. Only
firms with at least one year of data in both the pre- and post-event periods are included in the sample. All
regressions contain the same set of control variables as in Table 3. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Tstatistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed significance
level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at
state of location level.

Post*Ninth Circuit
Post*Ninth Circuit*AbnAcc
Post*AbnAcc
Ninth Circuit*AbnAcc
AbnAcc

Controls
Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE
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(1)
AbnDisx

(2)
AbnProd

(3)
RM

0.015
(3.97)***
-0.175
(-1.71)*
-0.069
(-0.83)
0.116
(1.50)
0.089
(1.66)

0.014
(1.80)*
-0.258
(-1.96)*
-0.008
(-0.14)
0.148
(1.57)
0.108
(1.71)*

0.023
(3.33)***
-0.374
(-2.48)**
-0.058
(-0.63)
0.200
(1.49)
0.203
(2.90)***

Yes
15,225
0.428
Yes
Yes

Yes
14,958
0.313
Yes
Yes

Yes
14,215
0.408
Yes
Yes

Table 10 Real Earnings Management (REM) Changes and Litigation Risk
Table 10 examines cross-sectional variation in changes in REM following the Ninth Circuit court ruling with
firm-specific litigation risk measured in the year before the ruling. The sample period is from 1995 to 2003,
excluding 1999, the year of the Ninth Circuit ruling. We exclude the financial and utility industries (sic 40004999 and sic 6000-6999). We exclude penny stocks (share price less than one dollar) and firms with missing state
of headquarter location. Only firms with at least one year of data in both the pre- and post-event periods are
included in the sample. All regressions contain the same set of control variables as in Table 3. All variables are
defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote
two-tailed significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity
and are clustered at state of location level.

Post*Ninth Circuit
Post*Ninth Circuit*LitRisk
Post*LitRisk
Ninth Circuit*LitRisk
LitRisk

Controls
Observations
R-squared
Firm FE
Year FE

54

(1)
AbnDisx

(2)
AbnProd

(3)
RM

0.009
(1.51)
0.030
(1.72)*
-0.019
(-1.60)
-0.020
(-0.93)
0.060
(4.97)***

0.009
(0.95)
0.038
(1.68)*
0.012
(0.80)
0.038
(1.64)
-0.019
(-1.40)

0.024
(2.15)**
0.044
(1.12)
0.002
(0.10)
0.011
(0.32)
0.036
(2.28)**

Yes
13,244
0.449
Yes
Yes

Yes
12,939
0.306
Yes
Yes

Yes
12,421
0.406
Yes
Yes

